Power, political legitimacy, armed insurgency, and the crisis of the Congolese state
By Prof Tarh Ntantang
Abstract
The emergence of former Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) President Joseph Kabila as the leader of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (Front pour la Refoundation de la Nation, FRN) marks a dramatic development in the country’s protracted political and security crisis. On 12 October 2026, Kabila’s leadership of the new political-military coalition, which incorporates elements of the Alliance Fleure Congo (AFC) and the March 23 Movement (M23), was publicly announced. This development marks a significant shift in the political trajectory of a former head of state who governed the country from 2001-2019 and transferred the presidency to Felix Tshisekedi after the disputed 2018 election.
This article examines the political, historical, institutional, and geopolitical implications of Kabila’s transition from president to leader of an armed opposition coalition. It asks how a former head of state, once responsible for preserving national sovereignty and constitutional order, becomes associated with a movement seeking to challenge the government through political and military means. Drawing on historical analysis, conflict studies, and contemporary reporting, the article explores the crisis of political legitimacy, contested elections, the militarisation of opposition politics, regional rivalries, and the political economy of Eastern Congo’s natural resources. It also considers the implications for civilian protection, national sovereignty, and ongoing peace initiatives. The central argument is that Kabila’s emergence at the head of the FRN can not be understood exclusively as an individual political transformation; it reflects deeper weaknesses in the Congolese state, unresolved grievances, competition for political power, and the persistent regionalisation of conflict. Nevertheless, grievances about governance cannot, by themselves, establish the legitimacy of armed rebellion or justify abuses against civilians.
INTRODUCTION
The Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced a recurring paradox in it postcolonial political history: leaders who promise national liberation, political stability, and institutional reconstruction have frequently governed amid armed conflict, political exclusion, and contested legitimacy. From the authoritarian government of mobutu Sese seko to the rebellion that brought Laurent-Desire Kabila to power, and subsequently the presidency of his son Joseph Kabila, the country has struggled to consolidate a political order in which constitutional institutions consistently prevail over personalized authority and armed coercion. The announcement of Kabila’s leadership of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN) on 12 October 2026 adds a consequential new chapter to this history. According to Reuters and the Associated Press, the FRN brings together political and military actors linked to the AFC-M23 insurgency in Eastern Congo. The coalition was presented as a vehicle for coordinating resistance against President Felix Tshisekedi’s government, with it leadership including former rebels and political figures (Associated Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026)
This development is remarkable because Kabila is not simply another opposition politician. He governed the country for almost eighteen years, presided over the country’s institutions, commanded its armed forces as head of state, and participated in the political arrangements that followed the devastating wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s. His subsequent association with an armed coalition challenging the government therefore raised fundamental questions about the meaning of political opposition, the limits of presidential power, the legitimacy of resistance, and the responsibilities of former leaders. The central question of this article is: How and why has Joseph Kabila moved from the presidency of the Democratic Republic of Congo to leading a political-military coalition challenging the government, and what does this transformation reveal about the country’s crisis of governance and national cohesion?
Three related questions guide the discussion. First, to what extent does Kabila’s political trajectory reflect long-standing weaknesses in the Congolese system of governance? Second, how do the FRN and its relationship with AFC-M23 complicate the distinction between political opposition and armed rebellion? Third, what are the consequences of this development for peace, regional relations, democratic accountability, and civilian security?
The article argues that Kabila’s transition should be understood within the intersection of personal political rivalry, institutional fragility, unresolved electoral disputes, the militarisation of political competition, and geopolitical interests. The FRN’s emergence may broaden the armed opposition’s political and organisational capacity, but it also risks intensifying the conflict by giving a former president’s political standing to a coalition associated with territorial conquest and allegations of external military support. The analysis does not assume the FRN represents the aspirations of Congolese citizens, nor does it treat the government’s claims against Kabila as independently proven merely because state authorities advanced them. Instead, it distinguishes reported developments, judicial findings, allegations, and political interpretations.
METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The article adopts a qualitative historical and political analysis based on documentary research. Its principal sources include contemporary reporting by Reuters and Associated Press, international reporting on the 2025 military court proceedings against Kabila, and United Nations documentation concerning the conflict in Eastern Congo. Historical scholarship on the Congo state and the political economy of African conflict provides a broader analytical framework.
The approach combines three perspectives:
Firstly, the theory of state fragility examines the state’s capacity to exercise authority, provide security, deliver public services, and establish a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. The DRC’s difficulty in extending effective civilian administration across its enormous territory, which has created opportunities for armed movements and competing authorities (Herbst, 2000).
Secondly, the political economy of conflict considers how access to minerals, trade routes, taxation, territorial control, and cross-border commercial networks can sustain armed organisations. Resources do not automatically cause war, but their distribution and control can influence the incentives of political and military actors (Autesserre, 2010; Stearns, 2011)
Thirdly, theories of political legitimacy and democratic accountability examine whether authority rests on constitutional rules, electoral consent, public participation, and institutional constraints, rather than simply on military strength or the authority to mobilise supporters
The analysis is limited by the rapidly evolving nature of the FRN and the difficulty of independently verifying the internal decision-making of a newly announced political-military organisation. Consequently, this article treats the coalition’s stated objectives as political claims rather than established evidence of its actual practices or popular support.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM KABILA DYNASTY TO THE POST-KABILA POLITICAL ORDER
LAURENT DESIRE KABILA AND THE POLITICS OF ARMED LIBERATION
Joseph Kabila’s political trajectory cannot be separated from his father’s history: Laurent-Désiré Kabila led the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in the 1996-1997 rebellion that overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu’s government had been weakened by economic decline, corruption, declining political legitimacy, and the consequences of regional conflicts following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. With substantial external assistance, particularly from Rwanda and Uganda, the AFDL advanced and entered Kinshasa in May 1997. Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed power and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. This episode illustrates a recurring dilemma in Congolese political history: armed movements may acquire legitimacy by presenting themselves as instruments of national liberation; their reliance on external military assistance can generate new sovereignty disputes and regional dependencies.
The subsequent conflict showed that overthrowing an authoritarian government doesn’t automatically resolve the political and security problems that produce rebellion. The Second Congo War followed, beginning in 1998 and drawing in several African states. The conflict and its aftermath devastated communities and contributed to a prolonged humanitarian emergency (Reyntjens, 2009; Stearns, 2001).
JOSEPH KABILA’S UNEXPECTED ASCENT TO THE PRESIDENCY
Following the assassination of Laurent-Desire Kabila in January 2001, Joseph Kabila became president. He succeeded during a period of severe insecurity, international pressure, and negotiations intended to end the regional war. Joseph Kabila later became a central figure in the transition to the 2003 transitional government and the 2006 elections. Those elections were an important institutional milestone because they created a framework of competitive national politics after years of war. Nonetheless, restoring electoral institutions did not eliminate structural problems. State authority remained uneven across the country. The security sector remained fragmented, and armed groups continue to operate in the East. Patronage politics, competition over mineral wealth, and weak local administration continue to complicate state-building.
Kabila’s presidency, therefore, embodied both continuity and change. His government helped sustain a national political framework after war, but it also faced persistent criticism concerning governance, corruption, and electoral credibility and the concentration of executive power.
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND THE DELAYED TRANSFER OF POWER
The end of Kabila’s constitutional presidential mandate became a defining controversy in the country’s political development. Elections scheduled for 2016 were delayed, generating demonstrations and political tensions. The resulting political crisis contributed to an agreement intended to pave the way for elections and a transfer of power.
The 2018 presidential election ultimately brought Felix Tshisekedi to the presidency in January 2019. However, political opponents disputed the election, and observers questioned its credibility. Kabila’s political influence remained significant after he left office, including through his political allies and the parliamentary balance that shaped the early Felix Tshisekedi administration. This history matters because the transfer of presidential authority didn’t immediately resolve the contest over political power. Instead, it established an uneasy relationship between a new president seeking greater autonomy and a former president whose political network retained influence. The later breakdown of relations between Tshisekedi and Kabila should, therefore, be understood as part of a longer struggle over control of state institutions, political alliances, and the terms of political succession.
THE EMERGENCE OF FRN: FROM POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO ARMED CONFRONTATION
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 12 OCTOBER 2026
The formation of the FRN represents the most consequential development in Kabila’s political trajectory since he left office. The coalition was announced in Goma, a major city in North Kivu that M23 captured in January 2025. It includes actors previously associated with AFC-M23 and positions Kabila as its political leader. Reuters reported that the coalition’s leadership includes Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Freddy Kaniki, and Sultani Makenga in deputy leadership roles. The organisation presents itself as a political-military movement intended to challenge the government in Kinshasa (Reuters)
The announcement’s significance lies in three dimensions. Firstly, it gives the armed opposition a leader with experience in national government and established political networks. Secondly, it potentially consolidates political and military actors under a more unified organisational structure. Thirdly, it transforms the confrontation with Tshisekedi from a struggle involving the incumbent government and an array of rebel organisations into a direct political contest involving a former president. The FRN’s stated objective is to restore the functioning of the republic and coordinate resistance against what its representatives characterize as tyranny. Its spokesperson has explicitly stated that the movement may use force. Such language raises an important question: Can a movement claim to restore constitutional government while making armed coercion an instrument of political change? The answer depends not simply on it declared objectives but on it conduct, treatment of civilians, political programs, and willingness to accept a legitimate and inclusive process of determining national leadership.
WHY THE FRN MATTERS POLITICALLY
The emergence of the FRN may be interpreted as an attempt to overcome the organisational fragmentation of armed opposition. Previously, the insurgency’s political and military components operated through related but distinct structures. A coalition headed by a former president could seek to connect military operations with political messaging, elite alliances, and claims of national legitimacy. However, organisational consolidation doesn’t necessarily mean popular legitimacy. An armed coalition can occupy territory and establish administrative structures without receiving freely expressed consent from the population living under it control. The distinction is particularly important in the DRC, where armed organisations have repeatedly claimed to protect communities or liberate the country while civilians have suffered from violence, displacement, coercion, and economic disruption. The FRN’s challenge will, therefore, be to demonstrate whether its stated commitment to national reconstruction has beyond the removal of the incumbent government. Does it offer a credible constitutional settlement, an accountable security sector, democratic elections, and protections for minority communities? Or does it primarily seek to replace one governing elite with another? The question remains open and should be assessed through verifiable political commitments and conduct rather than rhetoric alone.
FROM PRESIDENT TO REBEL LEADER: UNDERSTANDING KABILA’S POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
THE EROSION OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE
Former President Joseph Kabila’s transition into an armed opposition movement is not simply a change of political affiliation. It represents a fundamental rupture with the constitutional institutions the former leader once headed. During his tenure, Kabila led the national executive and exercised authority over the country’s armed forces. His subsequent leadership of the FRN places him in opposition to the government that claims constitutional authority over those same institutions. This development reflects a broader problem in political systems: when the transfer of power does not produce an accepted settlement between former and incumbent leaders. Instead of competing exclusively through elections, legislatures, courts, and peaceful political organisations, rivals may come to regard control of the state as an existential contest.
The relationship between Kabila and Tshisekedi illustrates this problem. Their post-2019 political accommodation deteriorated, and the former president’s relationship with actors associated with the Eastern insurgency became increasingly controversial. Kabila denied accusations that he supported the rebels, but his public appearance in Goma and the subsequent establishment of the FRN have made his relationship with the insurgency a central issue in Congolese politics (Reuters, 2026). It would be misleading, however, to attribute the entire transformation to personal hostility between the two men. Their rivalry operates within a political environment marked by institutional weaknesses, unresolved security problems, contested legitimacy, and competition for control of national resources.
PERSONAL AMBITION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RELEVANCE
Political leaders who leave office do not necessarily abandon their ambitions, networks, or influence. Former presidents may remain influential through political parties. Parliamentary alliances, economic interests, and relationships with security elites. For Kabila, the FRN offers a platform to challenge his successor’s authority. His supporters may frame the movement as a response to governance failures and insecurity. His opponents may interpret it as an attempt to regain power out of the constitutional process. Both interpretations must be examined critically: The allegation of political ambition does not, by itself, establish the illegitimacy of every grievance raised by a former president. Equally, the allegations of corruption or poor governance by an incumbent government do not establish that armed rebellion is a legitimate or necessary response. The fundamental democratic principle is that citizens should address a government’s failure through institutions that let them express their preferences freely and hold political leaders accountable. When former leaders and incumbent authorities abandon this principle, the political contest risks a struggle over who controls the institution of coercion.
THE PARADOX OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND REBELLION
Kabila’s transition presents a particularly striking paradox. A former head of state who once symbolised national authority is now leading an organisation challenging the government through a coalition that includes armed insurgents. The paradox is not unique to the DRC. Across several conflict-affected states, political elites have alternated between governmental office, opposition politics, exile, and armed mobilisation. Such transitions often reveal weak political institutions that cannot adequately manage competition among powerful actors. The Congolese case nevertheless has distinctive features. The country has experienced multiple regional wars, competing claims to authority in the East, and longstanding allegations of external involvement in internal conflicts. The FRN consequently enters an environment in which a political challenge to Kinshasa is inseparable from broader questions of national sovereignty and regional security.
EASTERN CONGO: THE SECURITY CRISIS BEHIND THE FRN
The FRN’s emergence cannot be understood without considering the M23 insurgency. M23 is one of the numerous armed organisations that have operated in Eastern Congo, where disputes over land, citizenship, community security, state authority, and regional intervention have contributed to recurrent violence. In January 2025, M23 captured Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and subsequently expanded its territorial control. This advance exposed the difficulties the Congolese armed forces face in defending major population centres and maintaining the government’s authority in the East. The capture of Goma has particular significance. Goma is not simply a provincial capital; it is a major commercial centre and a strategic gateway near Rwanda. Controlling the city gives an armed organisation administrative, logistical, and political advantages.
The FRN’s announcement in Goma therefore carries symbolic and strategic weight. A former president establishing a political-military coalition in a territory controlled by an insurgent movement demonstrates how far the conflict has moved beyond a conventional contest between government forces and isolated rebel units.
RWANDA AND THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT
The involvement of neighbouring states has defined the war in the DRC. The Congolese government, the UN, and Western governments have repeatedly accused Rwanda of supporting M23. Rwanda denies supporting the insurgency and has cited security threats originating in Eastern Congo. These competing positions must be situated within the region’s history, including the consequences of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the presence of armed groups in Eastern Congo, and long-standing disputes over border security. United Nations reporting has documented complex relationships among armed organisations, regional actors, and political networks. Such relationships make it difficult to treat the conflict as exclusively domestic or to explain it through a single ethnic, political, or economic cause. The FRN may further complicate the regional environment because Kabila’s status as a former president gives the coalition a political dimension that extends beyond the military activities of M23. If the movement becomes a vehicle for competing regional interests, the danger is that Congolese civilians will remain trapped in a conflict whose objectives are shaped partly by political and strategic calculations beyond their control. An illustrative example: in a local community in North Kivu, the local people may face insecurity from multiple directions: armed-group recruitment, military operations, disrupted trade, and the collapse of public services. A coalition may promise liberation from government failures, while the government promises restoration of sovereignty. Yet neither promise provides meaningful protection unless civilians experience a measurable reduction in violence and can participate freely in determining their political future.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINERALS AND ARMED CONFLICT
Eastern Congo’s minerals’ wealth is central to understanding the conflict, although minerals alone do not explain it origins and continuation. The region contains significant deposits of gold, tin, tantalum-bearing coltan, tungsten, and other commercially valuable resources. These resources are linked to international supply chains serving electronics, manufacturing, and other industries. Where state institutions are weak, control of mining areas, transport routes, checkpoints, and border closings can become an important source of revenue for armed organizations and political intermediaries. Taxation, coercive extraction, smuggling, and control over commercial networks can sustain armed conflict. Autesserre (2010) emphasises that international attention to the DRC has often concentrated on national and regional diplomacy while neglecting local conflicts and governance failures. Stearns (2011) similarly demonstrates the importance of understanding the historical and political relationships that sustain armed mobilisation. The FRN enters this environment with a political challenge that could affect both territorial control and governance of resource-producing areas.
MINERALS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL POWER
The economic significance of Eastern Congo’s minerals creates competing incentives for state and non-state actors. For the central government, control over mineral-producing territories is connected to national revenue, sovereignty, and the enforcement of mining regulations. For armed organisations, territorial control can provide access to taxation and commercial networks. For local communities, the central issue is whether mineral wealth contributes to employment, infrastructure, public services, and local development. The gap between national resource wealth and local insecurity is a central development problem. For example, consider a mining community where valuable minerals are extracted, but roads, hospitals, schools, and electricity remain inadequate. If local residents see armed groups, traders, and political elites benefiting while their living conditions deteriorate, distrust of public institutions may deepen. Armed organisations may exploit this discontent by presenting themselves as alternatives to the state. Yet if they establish their own coercive taxation systems, the underlying problem may simply change hands rather than disappear.
THE LIMITS OF A PURELY RESOURCE-BASED EXPLANATION
It would be analytically inadequate to explain the FRN solely through competition over minerals. The conflict in the Eastern Congo also involves political exclusion, local security dilemmas, land disputes, contested citizenship, historical grievances, and regional rivalries. Minerals’ wealth is therefore best understood as one factor within a wider political economy of conflict. It can finance armed organisations, raise the strategic importance of territory, and create incentives for external involvement, but it doesn’t automatically generate rebellion. A durable settlement must address both the political causes of insecurity and the economic systems that allow violence to remain profitable.
THE JUDICIAL DIMENSION: KABILA’S CONVICTION AND THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
On 30 September 2025, a military court in Kinshasa sentenced Kabila to death in absentia after convicting him of treason, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in a case concerning alleged support for the M23 insurgency. The court also ordered him to pay substantial damages. Kabila denied wrongdoing and described the proceedings as politically motivated. He was not present at the trial and was not represented by counsel (Reuters, 2025). This judgment is an important part of the political context surrounding the FRN. It should not, however, be confused with an independent finding that resolves every disputed question about the former president’s relationship with the insurgency. Nor does Kabila’s denial of wrongdoing erase the significance of the court ruling.
Here are three issues that require attention
Firstly, accountability for serious crimes is essential. Allegations of war crimes against humanity, treason, and support of armed violence must be investigated through credible legal procedures. Political office should not provide immunity from legitimate accountability.
Secondly, due process matters. Trials involving prominent political figures must meet appropriate standards of independence, access to legal representation, and meaningful opportunities to challenge evidence. From legal perspectives, proceedings conducted in absentia raise particular questions about the defendant’s ability to participate in the defence and the broader credibility of the process.
Thirdly, justice must be distinguished from political retaliation. If legal proceedings are widely perceived as instruments for eliminating political opponents, public confidence in the courts may deteriorate. Conversely, dismissing every persecution of a powerful former leader as political persecution risks undermining accountability. The challenge for the DRC is to ensure that justice is neither selectively applied nor abandoned in the name of political reconciliation. The FRN’s emergence may intensify these dilemmas. The government may present the coalition as confirmation of a security threat, while the movement may use the judicial case to reinforce claims of political persecution. Neither narrative should replace an evidence- based assessment of responsibility, legality, and civilian harm.
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: IS ARMED REBELLION AN ALTERNATIVE TO POLITICAL REFORM?
One of the most consequential questions raised by political analysis is whether armed rebellion should credibly be presented as a route towards democratic renewal. The coalition’s representatives have accused the government of governance and security failures. These are serious issues in a country where many citizens still face insecurity, limited public services, and weak accountability. However, political dissatisfaction does not automatically confer democratic legitimacy on an armed organisation. Democracy requires more than removing an incumbent leader. It requires meaningful competition, credible elections, civil liberties, independent institutions, protection of minorities, and peaceful transfers of power. An armed movement may claim to represent the people while restricting their ability to disagree. It may promise national reconstruction while subordinating civilian institutions to military commanders. It may denounce authoritarianism while concentrating power in a new leadership. The test of the FRN’s democratic credentials, therefore, lies in practical commitments:
● Will it accept genuinely competitive elections under impartial administration?
● Will it protect political opponents, journalists, civil society organisations, and independent media?
● Will it reject forced recruitment, collective punishment, and attacks on civilians?
● Will it support an inclusive constitutional process rather than impose political outcomes by force?
These questions also apply to the government. Tshisekedi’s administration must be judged by its respect for constitutional limits, political pluralism, judicial independence, and the rights of citizens in government-controlled areas. A credible democratic settlement cannot depend on the assumption that one side has all political legitimacy and the other has none.
THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES: CIVILIANS AT THE CENTER OF THE CRISIS
The political contest between Kabila and Tshisekedi must not obscure the experiences of the people living through the conflict. Eastern Congo has endured repeated displacement, loss of livelihoods, destruction of property, disruption of education, and serious threats to civilians’ safety. The expansion of M23’s territorial control and continued fighting have compounded an already severe humanitarian emergency.
The creation of the FRN raises the possibility of further escalation. If the coalition strengthens the coordination of the armed groups, government forces may intensify military operations. If the government attempts to isolate the movement through broad security measures. Civilians may face additional restrictions and displacement. These are risks, not inevitable outcomes, but they demand urgent attention.
DISPLACEMENT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF LIVELIHOODS
Conflict destroys more than physical infrastructure. It also undermines the social and economic systems families rely on to survive. Farmers may abandon fields because of insecurity. Traders may lose access to markets. Children may miss months or years of schooling. Health facilities may lose staff or supplies. Displaced families may be forced to depend on humanitarian assistance while facing uncertain prospects for return. For example, a family displaced from a rural community near a contested road may lose both its home and its principal source of income. Even with fighting subsiding, the family may be unable to return until land access, security, housing, and public services are restored. This illustrates why territorial control can not be treated as a sufficient measure of peace. A town may be occupied by one side rather than another without residents experiencing genuine security.
GENDER AND THE CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE OF WAR
Women and girls may face risks during displacement and armed conflict, including sexual violence, exploitation, family separation, and barriers to education and health care in particular. Men and boys may face forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, or suspicion from armed actors. Older people and persons with disabilities may encounter additional obstacles when fleeing violence or accessing assistance. These vulnerabilities require responses that recognise civilians as rights holders rather than instruments of political mobilisation. All parties to the conflict must respect international humanitarian law, protect civilians, and ensure humanitarian organisations can operate safely. Serious allegations of abuses should be investigated impartially, regardless of the identity of the alleged perpetrators.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The FRN’s formation is likely to complicate diplomatic efforts to end the conflict because it changes the armed opposition’s political identity and leadership. Before the announcement, negotiations involved the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 Movement. Creating a new coalition under Kabila introduces a former national leader into a process already burdened by mistrust and competing security demands. Doha had made limited progress in the peace talks. Political pundits viewed Kabila’s new leadership position as a complication for the peace deal.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: MOVING BEYOND THE POLITICS OF ARMED CONFLICT
1- ESTABLISH AN INCLUSIVE AND VERIFIABLE PEACE PROCESS
Negotiations should include the Congolese government, relevant armed actors, political opposition parties, civil society, religious leaders, women’s organisations, youth representatives, and communities affected by the crisis. Inclusion doesn’t mean granting every armed group an authentic right to govern. It means ensuring that the political settlement reflects the concerns of the citizens who bear the consequences of war. A credible process should establish clear procedures for ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian access, dispute resolution, and compliance.
2- SEPARATE POLITICAL COMPETITION FROM MILITARY COERCION
Former presidents and opposition leaders must be able to participate in peaceful politics, but political standing should not license violence. Likewise, governments must not use national security as a pretext for suppressing legitimate opposition. The DRC should strengthen the independent electoral administration, judicial accountability, legislative oversight, and constitutional safeguards. These institutions are essential to reducing the incentive for political actors to seek power through armed means.
3- CREATE CREDIBLE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
It should be noted that serious allegations of crimes should be investigated through procedures that meet appropriate standards of independence and due process. Accountability should be extended to members of government forces, armed opposition groups, and other actors implicated by credible evidence. Amnesty arrangements considered part of a peace process should not become blanket immunity for serious international crimes.
4- ADDRESS THE LOCAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT
Peace initiatives must address disputes over land, citizenship, local administration, security, and access to economic opportunities. These problems can not be resolved exclusively through negotiations among leaders in national capitals. Local peace committees, community mediation, land dispute resolution, and participatory governance can help address grievances before they are mobilised with actors.
5- REFORM MINERALS GOVERNANCE
The government and relevant authorities should improve transparency in mineral licensing, taxation, and exports. Independent monitoring should seek to prevent armed organisations and corrupt intermediaries from benefiting from illicit resource extraction. Mining communities should receive tangible benefits through infrastructure, health care, education, environmental safeguards, and employment opportunities.
6- PROTECT DISPLACED PEOPLE AND REBUILD LIVELIHOODS
Humanitarian assistance must be sustained, and any return or relocation of displaced families should be voluntary, safe, and dignified. Reconstruction should include schools, health facilities, roads, water systems, and support of agriculture and local commerce.
7- STRENGTHEN REGIONAL GUARANTEES
Regional governments and international partners should support a verifiable framework to address cross-border armed activity and external military involvement, refugee protection, and the security concerns of neighbouring states like Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania, to name a few. Such arrangements should protect the DRC’S territorial integrity, recognising that sustainable regional security depends on cooperation rather than proxy warfare.
CONCLUSION
All in all, Joseph Kabila’s emergence as leader of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation marks a dramatic turning point in the DRC’s political history. The former president, who governed from 2001-2019, now leads a coalition incorporating actors associated with the AFC-M23 insurgency. This transformation places him at the centre of a confrontation that raises fundamental questions about political legitimacy, constitutional authority, regional security, and the future of democratic governance.
The FRN’s formation reflects more than a personal conflict between Kabila and his successor president Tshisekedi. It reveals the enduring weaknesses of institutions that have struggled to manage political succession, the persistence of armed networks in national politics, and the difficulty of establishing legitimate state authority across Eastern Congo.
The development also demonstrates the limitations of treating military victory as a substitute for political settlement. A coalition may challenge an incumbent government in the name of national reconstruction, but its credibility depends on whether it protects civilians, accepts democratic accountability, and offers a political future beyond armed confrontation. The same obligation applies to the government. The judicial case against Kabila further complicates the situation. The 2025 conviction and death sentence in absentia are significant facts in the political context. They do not eliminate the need for scrutiny of due process, nor do they excuse violence by any party. Accountability and procedural fairness must reinforce rather than undermine one another.
Ultimately, the DRC faces a choice between the continued militarisation of political competition and a more inclusive system in which grievances can be addressed through credible institutions. That choice requires action against abuses, transparent management of mineral wealth, regional cooperation, meaningful local participation, and a peace process centred on civilian protection. Joseph Kabila’s transformation from former president to leader of the FRN is, therefore, both a personal political rupture and a symptom of a deeper national crisis (The DRC’S insecurity is sustained by interacting problems: weak state presence in some provinces, competition over resources, regional intervention, local grievances, limited accountability, and the repeated failures to establish an inclusive political settlement) The decisive question is not simply whether Kabila can challenge Tshisekedi, but whether the Congolese political system can finally move beyond the recurring struggle to capture the state and build institutions that protect the rights and aspirations of its citizens.
Prof. Tarh Humphrey Ntantang (PhD) is a Cameroonian political economist, researcher, scholar, thought leader, and author. He is a global policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, conflict analysis, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a doctorate in political economy and international affairs from the University of Yaounde One. He is also a certified climate migration scholar at York University, Toronto, Canada. He is the founder/CEO of Ntantang Research and Consulting Centre (NRCC) in Yaounde, Cameroon, a think tank focused on research and policy analysis. He is the author of the book titled “CAMEROON ANGLOPHONE CRISIS: THE TOLL OF WAR”.

